Public Interest Right to Participate in Federal Administrative Agency Proceedings: Scope and Effect by Hiser, Wray C.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 47 | Issue 4 Article 6
Spring 1972
Public Interest Right to Participate in Federal
Administrative Agency Proceedings: Scope and
Effect
Wray C. Hiser
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hiser, Wray C. (1972) "Public Interest Right to Participate in Federal Administrative Agency Proceedings: Scope and Effect," Indiana
Law Journal: Vol. 47: Iss. 4, Article 6.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol47/iss4/6
NOTES
PUBLIC INTEREST RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDINGS: SCOPE AND
EFFECT
Growing public awareness and concern over the environment have
resulted in individuals and organized public interest groups seeking to
intervene in administrative agency proceedings in order to participate
and influence agency actions. As a consequence, such decisions as the
licensing and placement of dams, power plants, high voltage lines and
natural gas pipelines are no longer left to the sole determination of govern-
ment and industry. The right to intervene, therefore, has become an
important issue, as petitions to intervene have become more frequent.
This note will review the development of the "public interest" right
to intervene in administrative hearings and the role of such participation
in the administrative process. While the benefits of intervention include
improved governmental responsiveness to public demands, these benefits
must be weighed against the consequences of administrative delay, greater
taxpayer costs and possible overburdening of the administrative process.
The goal, then, is the reconciliation of public participation with the need
for efficiency and economy.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE
When Congress created the various regulatory agencies it often
provided for participation in trial-type proceedings by "parties in interest"
or persons whose participation in those proceedings might be in the
"public interest."' The Administrative Procedure Act2 incorporated this
broad guideline for participation:
1. For example, the Natural Gas Act provides that:
The FPC may admit as a party . . . any representative of interested con-
sumers or security holders, or any competitor of a party to such proceeding, or
any other person whose participation in the proceeding may be in the public
interest.
15 U.S.C. § 717n(a) (1970). An identical provision appears in the Federal Power Act,
16 U.S.C. § 825g(a) (1970). See also Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45b
(1970) ; Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79s (1970) ; Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970) ; Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42
U.S.C. § 2239 (1970) ; Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970) ; In-
terstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 42 (1970) ; Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1489 (1970).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970).
SCOPE AND EFFECT
. . . So far as the orderly conduct of public business permits,
an interested person may appear before an agency or its re-
sponsible employees for the presentation, adjustment, or deter-
mination of an issue, request, or controversy in a proceeding,
whether interlocutory, summary, or otherwise, or in connection
with an agency function. . ..'
Some agencies, under congressional authority to prescribe their own pro-
cedural rules and regulations, have also included the "public interest" as
one standard for intervention.4
Few cases have arisen to permit judicial interpretation of this
standard because of the small number of parties seeking to intervene
in the public interest. However, in those few cases dealing with the
problem, the courts have tended to confuse public intervention with
standing to seek judicial review of final agency orders.' In FCC v.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1970). This provision of the Act applies to any agency
proceeding, whether adjudicative or rule making, formal or informal. The Act pro-
vides that in rule making:
[Tihe agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or
without opportunity for oral presentation.
5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
In adjudication:
The agency shall give all interested parties opportunity for- . . . the sub-
mission and consideration of facts, arguments, offers of settlement, or proposals
of adjustment when time, the nature of the proceedings, and the public interest
permit ...
5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1970).
Thus the standards for intervention in rule making or adjudication are essentially
the same.
4. For example, the FPC Rules of Practice and Procedure provide:
A petition to intervene may be filed by any person claiming a right to intervene
or an interest of such nature that intervention is necessary or appropriate to the
administration of the statute under which the proceeding is brought. Such
right or interest may be: . . .
(3) Any other interest of such nature that petitioner's participation may be
in the public interest.
18 C.F.R. § 1.8(2) (b) (1972). See also AEC, Rules of Practice, 10 C.F.R. § 2.714
(1972) ; CAB, Rules of Practice in Economic Proceedings, 14 C.F.R. § 302.15 (1971) ;
FTC, General Procedures, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.16(c), 3.14 (1971) ; SEC, Rules of Practice,
17 C.F.R. 201.9(e) (1971) ; NLRB, Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.29 (1971) ;
FCC, General Rules of Practice and Procedure, 47 C.F.R. § 1.223 (1971) ; ICC, Prac-
tice and Procedure, 49 C.F.R. § 1100.72 (1971). The Army Corps of Engineers Ad-
ministrative Procedure, 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g) (1971), provides that "public hearings
are helpful and will be held whenever there appears to be sufficient public interest to
justify such action."
5. Standing to seek review of an administrative order is based on entirely different
standards than standing to intervene. Instead of simply being an "interested person" or
a representative of the "public interest" as under the intervention statutes, a prospective
petitioner for judical review must establish that he has been "aggrieved" or "adversely
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National Broadcasting Co.,6 radio station WHDH in Boston applied
to the Federal Communications Commission to increase power and to
broadcast at night. KOA, a Denver clear-channel radio station already
licensed on the same frequency of 850 kilocycles 24 hours daily, petitioned
to intervene on the basis of Commission rules which precluded licensing
two stations to operate on a clear channel at night. The Commission
denied intervention.' The FCC then amended its rules by removing the
850 kilocycle frequency from the list of clear channels and approved
WHDH's application.8 On review, the court of appeals reversed the
Commission's order.9 The FCC thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court,
contending that KOA had no standing to seek judicial review. The Court
determined that under § 312(b) of the Federal Communications Act1"
KOA was entitled to become a party to the FCC proceeding which, in
effect, threatened an amendment of its license. The Court concluded
that, as a result, KOA had standing to challenge the FCC order:
In view of the fact that § 312(b) grants KOA the right
to become a party to the proceedings, we think it plain that it
is a party aggrieved, or a party whose interests will be adversely
affected. . .. "
Shortly after this decision, the Federal Power Commission, in an
attempt to limit the effects of the ruling, began to admit interveners
under specified conditions. In Interstate Electric, Inc. v. FPC,"2 Inter-
state had petitioned to intervene in order to oppose the merger of two
competitor electric companies. The FPC granted limited intervention,
stating that the permission "shall not be construed as recognition by
affected" by the agency order, or that he is suffering a legal wrong. Administrative
Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). See also Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79x(a) (1970) ; Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825(1) (b)
(1970) ; Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(b) (1970) ; Federal Communi-
cations Act, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970).
6. 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
7. 8 F.C.C. 397, 413 (1940).
8. 8 F.C.C. at 400.
9. 132 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
10. Any station license . . . may be modified by the Commission . . . if in
the judgment of the Commission such action will promote the public interest,
convenience, and necessity. . . . No such order of modification shall become
final until the holder of the license . . . shall have been notified in writing of
the proposed action and the grounds and reasons therefor, and shall have been
given reasonable opportunity . . . to show cause by public hearings, if requested,
why such order of modification should not issue.
47 U.S.C. § 316(a) (1970).
11. 319 U.S. at 247.
12. 164 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1947).
SCOPE AND EFFECT
the Commission that [Interstate] might be aggrieved by any order or
orders of the Commission entered in this proceeding."" After the FPC
authorized the merger, Interstate sought review, claiming a right to
challenge the order. The court of appeals dismissed, stating that Inter-
state had submitted no evidence that it was an aggrieved party. The court
relied on the FPC's reservation, implying that without this restriction
Interstate would have had standing to seek judicial review.
The converse of the theory that intervention implies a right of
standing to seek judicial review was first expressed in National Coal
Association v. FPC.4 The East Tennessee Natural Gas Company applied
to the FPC for authorization of a pipeline to supply the Atomic Energy
Commission at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The National Coal Association,
the United Mineworkers and the Railway Labor Association were allowed
to intervene to protest the pipeline. The FPC approved the pipeline,
and the intervenors sought review. In contesting the petitioners' standing
to seek review, the FPC argued that since it had granted intervention
in its discretion, the petitioners had no "right" of intervention and, there-
fore, no right to seek judicial review. The court of appeals first found
that petitioners were competitors threatened with financial loss and,
therefore, were "aggrieved persons" entitled to judicial review. Then,
in reply to the FPC's argument that petitioners had no "right" to inter-
vene, the court said, "We think it clear that any person who would be
'aggrieved' by the Commission's order, such as a competitor, is also a
person who has a right to intervene." 5 This logic was directly reaffirmed
in Elm City Broadcasting Corp. v. United States,6 where the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the FCC has no
discretion to deny intervention to a person who would have standing to
challenge the final order.
The following year the same court developed the obverse of this
theory, that if there is no right to judicial review, there is no right to
intervene. 7 In Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v. FPC,8 the
13. Id. at 485.
14. 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
15. Id. at 467.
16. 235 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See also American Communication Ass'n v.
United States, 298 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ; Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v.
FPC, 265 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir.
1958) ; Metropolitan Television Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1955);
Camden Radio v. FCC, 220 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1954). But see Lynchburg Gas Co. v.
FPC, 284 F.2d 756 (3d Cir. 1960).
17. But see Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39 MTNN. L. Rxv.
353 (1955):
[M]ay one who has no standing to obtain review become a party to the admin-
istrative proceeding? The answer is that the rules governing intervention are
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FPC denied two petitions for intervention in a natural gas purchase
certification. The companies sought review, contending abuse of discre-
tion by the FPC. The court found that since neither was an "aggrieved
person," neither had the right to intervene and dismissed the action for
lack of standing.
By this time the courts had so intermingled intervention and stand-
ing to seek judicial review that the doctrines had little, if any, individual
significance. Thus, in National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch,"9
the D.C. court again equated intervention with standing to seek judicial
review. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare had an-
nounced hearings to determine whether the welfare laws of Nevada and
Connecticut failed to conform to federal standards. The plaintiff, an
association of welfare recipients, requested permission to intervene and
participate in the hearings; the request was rejected. The association's
petition for judicial review resulted in reversal of the HEW order:
Cases concerning the question of standing before one or the
other tribunal have been used interchangeably in resolving
questions of standing to intervene. Except for the adjustments
necessary for assuring the manageability of administrative
proceedings, the criteria for standing for review of agency
action appear to assimilate the criteria for standing to inter-
vene.
2 0
To support the decision, the court relied on Professor Davis's statement
that the right to intervene in administrative proceedings is closely related
to the elaborate body of law concerning standing.2' The court, however,
failed to consider his next statement: "But intervention and standing
to challenge are not the same and are not governed by the same consi-
quite different from the rules governing standing to obtain review.
Id. at 382.
18. 243 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
19. 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
20. Id. at 732-33. Professor Davis concluded: "The cases indicate no appreciable
difference between one who has an 'interest,' one who is 'adversely affected,' and one
who is 'aggrieved.'" 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 216 (1958) [herein-
after cited as DAvis]. See also Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
In 1971 HEW issued Rules of Practice and Procedure for state conformity hear-
ings which included similar guidelines for public participation:
Other individuals or groups may be recognized as parties, if the issues to be
considered at the hearing have caused them injury and their interest is within
the zone of interests to be protected by the governing Federal statute.
36 Fed. Reg. 1454-55 (1971).
21. 1 DAVIS, supra note 20, § 8.11, at 564 (1958).
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derations." 2 Professor Davis sets out some of these considerations and
policies distinguishing intervention from standing to challenge:
The central problem of intervention is usually the disadvantage
to the tribunal and to other parties of extended cross-
examination; judicial review involves no such problem. Ade-
quate protection for interests obliquely affected may often be
afforded through limited participation; no such compromise
concerning judicial review is customary. No constitutional
restrictions affect intervention; standing to obtain review is
substantially affected by the constitutional requirement of
case or controversy. Intervention means mere participation
in a proceeding already initiated by others; obtaining judicial
review normally means instituting an entirely new judicial
proceeding. 8
While the courts continued to confuse these two concepts, the
commentators began to stress the need for distinguishing intervention
from judicial review, but for conflicting reasons. Professor Shapiro
cites the need for differentiating between these concepts to remove the
limitations on intervention and to encourage more public participation
in agency proceedings.2 In contrast, Professor Jaffe argues for a separa-
tion of the concepts in order to restrict unlimited intervention resulting
in considerable delays and inefficiencies. 5
22. Id. One practical reason for granting intervention to any person who would
be adversely affected is to allow him to build a record for review. "The right to appeal
from an order presupposes participation in the proceedings which led to it." Virginia
Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 265 F.2d 364, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Professor Jaffe
disagrees:
Does standing to appeal necessarily imply a right to an administrative hear-
ing? It will be said that a right to appeal to be "effective" implies a right to
make or participate in making the administrative record. No doubt a right to
participate at the administrative level increases the effective scope of the right
to appeal, but the right to attack an order resting on a record made by others,
or on no record at all, could be valuable. It would have precisely the virtue, if
that 'virtue were being sought, of expanding the class of potential public cham-
pions to attack "obviously" invalid orders without a similar expansion of the
administrative process.
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTIoN 524-25 (1965) (emphasis in
original) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE].
23. 3 DAVIS, supra note 20, § 22.08, at 241 (1958).
24. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies and Arbi-
trators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 728 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro].
25. JAFFE, supra note 22, at 525 (1965). In a case relaxing standing requirements,
the Supreme Court has said, "Where statutes are concerned, the trend is toward en-
largement of the class of people who may protest administrative action." Association of
Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
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These two commentators express the contrasting policies concerning
intervention. One policy proposes more liberal rules for intervention
and broader judicial interpretation of the existing rules and regulations.
The basis for this view is the belief that more intervention means more
public participation, resulting in more responsive government regulation.
The opposite argument is that more intervention will engulf the already
overburdened agencies, resulting in more delays, less responsiveness,
greater costs and possibly a breakdown of the entire administrative
system.
THE NEED FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
The proponents of liberalized intervention contend that a public
right to intervene is needed because the agencies have been unable or
unwilling to safeguard the public interest on their own.26 It is also argued
that greater public participation will induce agency action more favorable
to the general public. 7
Still another reason offered is that public participation in rule
making may be of particular aid when the final rule is an unpopular one,
for the losers before the agency will less likely sabotage a rule if they
have had an adequate opportunity to present their objections first.2"
While this theory may have some validity in small group contexts, there
is reason to doubt its application to the macroadministrative process.
First, even unlimited public interest group participation would allow
only a small number of dissenters to personally present their objections
to the rulemaking authority. While elected spokesmen or hired attorneys
may present the common objections shared by the majority of the
membership, it is unlikely that this vicarious dissent would be sufficient
to pacify violent objections. Indeed, it is not clear that the mere pre-
sentation of objections before an agency constitutes sufficient "partici-
pation" in rulemaking so as to reconcile the protestors to the final agency
decision. Thus, while there may be some cathartic benefit in public
participation, it is likely to be very minor.
26. Keller, The Law of Administrative Standing and the Public Right of Interven-
tion, 21 FED. CoM. B.J. 134 (1967).
27. Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Prop-
erty, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1970). Bonfield
also argues that public participation is desirable because it "helps to elicit 'the informa-
tion, facts and probabilities which are necessary to fair and intelligent action' by those
responsible for promulgating administrative rules." Id. at 540.
28. Id. at 541. Occasionally this theory has been oversimplified to the point that
an administrative agency is perceived simply as a scale, responding favorably to the party
with the greatest volume of evidence. The result is that the agency is deluged with an
overabundance of witnesses and exhibits, creating excessive delay.
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Implicit in many of the arguments for greater public participation
is the theory that the regulatory commissions have been "captured" by
the very industries which they were created to regulate.2 Even one com-
missioner of the FCC, Nicholas Johnson, has noted the reluctance of
the agencies to consider the public interest when it conflicts with industry
objectives. Commissioner Johnson states: "For those who attempt
to challenge the subgovernment, there is little toleration. There is an
iron fist reaction every time the public shows even the most pathetic
willingness to do battle.""8
Professor Sax is another who criticizes the administrative process
for failing to protect the public interest:
[T]he administrative process tends to produce not the voice of
the people, but the voice of the bureaucrat-the administrative
perspective posing as the public interest. Simply put, the fact
is that the citizen does not need a bureaucratic middleman to
identify, prosecute, and vindicate his interest in environmental
quality. He is perfectly capable of fighting his own battles-
if only he is given the tools with which to do the job.8
The means which Professor Sax envisions, however, extend beyond
broader participation in agency proceedings. He recommends that
in light of administrative inflexibility environmentalists, consumers
and public interest advocates should turn to the courts for relief.8 2
29. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 867 (1970). Accord, 116
CONG. REC. 10246 (1970) (remarks of Senator Proximire, D. Wis.). See also Hunting-
ton, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads and the Public Interest,
61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952).
30. Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEo. L.J. 869, 884 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Johnson]. Commissioner Mary Gardner Jones of the FTC is less
emphatic but offers more insight into why the agencies are not overly responsive to the
demands of public interest groups:
Too much attention has been paid in the past to insulating agencies from exces-
sive or improper pressure by special-interest groups or political interests or to
concerns with ensuring that administrative agencies act at all times expedi-
tiously and fairly. While these are important concerns, they tend to obscure the
basic problem of providing incentives whereby administrative agencies will per-
ceive and react with imagination and sensitivity to the ever-changing needs and
new conditions constantly emerging in society.
Jones, The Role of Administrative Agencies as Instruments of Social Reform, 19 AD. L.
Rxv. 279, 300 (1967).
31. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 56
(1971).
32. "Our need is not for more or fancier procedures before the same old agencies-
it is for a shift in the center of gravity of decision-making." Id. at 61.
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THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE
In response to the arguments for broader public participation in
administrative proceedings, the courts have taken an affirmative ap-
proach. In Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
FCC,3 the D.C. court granted a representative of the licensing public
the right to intervene in a license renewal proceeding. The basis of the
decision granting intervention was not the earlier confusion, equating
intervention with the right to obtain judicial review. Instead, the court
relied on the Commission's mandate to act in the public interest. Accord-
ing to the court, "[i]n order to safeguard the public interest in broad-
casting, . . . some 'audience participation' must be allowed in license
renewal proceedings." 4 This case has provided a precedent for other
individuals and public interest groups to obtain admission to various
administrative proceedings."3 Presumably, in some cases the agencies have
simply granted intervention rather than attempt to defend denials before
unfavorable courts. In the few cases in which an agency has denied inter-
vention, the denial has generally been reversed on review.
In Palisades Citizens Association, Inc. v. CAB," the court directly
recognized a "public interest" right to intervene. The CAB was investi-
gating a request for helicopter service between Baltimore, Maryland,
and Washington, D.C. The plaintiff, an association of property owners,
sought to intervene to protest the service in order to reduce "noise, air
pollution and safety hazards." The court held that these environmental
questions were proper "public interest" issues to be presented to the
Board and considered by it.
Further, in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin,8 several
environmentalist organizations petitioned the Secretary of Agriculture
to suspend the registration of products containing DDT for sale in
33. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
34. Id. at 1005.
35. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970); National
Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ; Cities of States-
ville v. AEC, 441 F.2d 962 (D.C Cir. 1969); Citizens for Allegan County, Inc. v. FPC,
414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Jaurez Gas Co. v. FPC, 375 F2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Powleton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. Department of HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D.
Pa. 1968).
36. See, e.g., Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ; Marine Space Enclo-
sures v. FMC, 420 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Hanes, Citizen Par-
ticipation and Its Impact Upon Prompt and Responsible Administrati've Action, 24 Sw.
L.J. 731, 741 (1970): "Over-reaction on the part of agencies to obviate reversal may
add considerable delay." See also Shapiro, supra note 24, at 744.
37. 420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
38. 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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interstate commerce. When the Secretary took no action, the petitioners
filed suit to enforce compliance. The Secretary moved to dismiss on the
basis that petitioners lacked standing. Again, the court held for the
petitioners, stating that "[c]onsumers of regulated products and services
have standing to protect the public interest in the proper administration
of a regulatory system enacted for their benefit.""0
Similarly, in Moss v. CAB,; the court voided an increase in domestic
air fares arrived at in private meetings between the Board and repre-
sentatives of the airline industry as a violation of the Federal Aviation
Act. 1 The court said, "Congress requires public participation in making
rates because it is the public who pays them." 2
.The "public participation" doctrine has also arisen in the environ-
mental law context. In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v.
AEC,"8 petitioners alleged that certain rules adopted by the Atomic
Energy Commission failed to satisfy the requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969"4 (NEPA). The AEC rules in
question45 provided that environmental factors need not be considered
by the hearing board unless affirmatively raised by some party to the
hearing and that the hearing board was prohibited from independently
evaluating environmental factors if other agencies had already certified
those factors by their own standards. The court, holding that these rules
failed to meet NEPA requirements, characterized the effect NEPA
has on administrative agencies: "NEPA . . . makes environmental
protection a part of the mandate of every federal agency and depart-
ment."4 If every agency is thus required to consider environmental factors
fully, public interest groups have expanded authority upon which to
claim a right to intervene and participate in the administrative process.
The development of a "public interest" right to participate in agency
proceedings involves several important considerations. First, the pro-
ponents of broader public participation have justified their demands for
more access by asserting that the commissions have become industry-
oriented. It has been so often repeated that the regulated control the
regulators that the notion has achieved wide acceptance.4 The fact that
39. Id. at 1097.
40. 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
41. Federal Aviation Act § 1002(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1970), requires a public
hearing before the Board may change an existing rate.
42. 430 F.2d at 902.
43. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
45. 10 C.F.R. § 50, App. D (1971).
46. 449 F.2d at 1112.
47. The commissions are surrounded daily by industry representatives and experts,
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the courts have recognized a public interest right to intervene indicates
that they have not fully accepted the "capture" theory.4" Instead, the
courts seem to recognize that the agencies have been isolated.,9
The independence of the commissions from the executive branch
makes them extremely susceptible to industry pressure exerted through
Congress." But, at the same time, these commissions are susceptible
to counter-pressure by consumers, environmentalists or advocates of
the public interest. The regulatory commissions are sensitive political
bodies, quick to adjust to any major change in the power structure:
while consumers or the public are seldom represented. The continuation of commission
regulation depends upon the acceptance of the regulated industry; thus, the commission
begins to compromise with the industry.
Commissions operate in hostile environments, and their regulatory policies be-
come conditional, upon the acceptance of regulation by the regulated groups.
In the long run, a commission is forced to come to terms with the regulated
groups as a condition of its survival.
Bernstein, The Commissions Have Failed, in THE INDEPENDENT FEDERAL REGULATORY
AGENCIES 61 (L. Salomon ed. 1959).
A regulatory commission's view of the public welfare is inevitably limited to
its own sphere of experience. . . . As long as each agency administers its
regulations without regard for the programs of other agencies, the welfare of
the regulated industry becomes a standard of reference for determining the
public interest.
M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMSMISSION 161 (1955).
Also of importance is the fact that commissioners, their staff and representatives of
the regulated industry share similar backgrounds, have primarily the same interests and
are in constant day-to-day association.
I once suggested to Professor Jaffe of the Harvard Law School that a good
subject for a paper in his seminar would be "The Influence of the Car Pool on
Administrative Law"; perhaps we should add the cocktail party and the Satur-
day night poker game.
Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 429, 438
(1960). See also L. KOHLMEIER, THE REGULATORS 69-82 (1969).
48. Shapiro, supra note 24, at 765.
49. The cardinal fact that underlies the demand for broadened public partici-
pation is that governmental agencies rarely respond to interests that are not
represented in their proceedings.
The Why, Where, and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative
Process 5 (Address by Prof. Cramton to the Administrative Process Symposium, George-
town Univ. Law Center, Sept. 17, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Cramton].
50. Regulatory commissions are distinct from executive agencies in that they are
"independent" of the executive, i.e. they are not under the direct control of the executive
office, the staff and upper echelon officals are not appointed by the President and their
budgets are not reviewed by the Bureau of the Budget. As a result, the President and
top-ranking executive officers are not inclined to intervene on behalf of these commis-
sions against congressional pressure. See Harris, The Senatorial Rejection of Leland
Olds: A Case Study, 45 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 674 (1951). In 1930, Congress "reorgan-
ized" the Federal Tariff Commission by ending the terms of all the commissioners in of-
fice, resulting in a complete turnover of personnel at one time. The commissions are
also subject to congressional control of the purse strings. See R. CUSHMAN, THE INDE-
PENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 449-50 (1941).
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We are not entitled at this point to assume that because in the
past agencies have had little regard to environmental protection
they will continue in that way in the future. The political situa-
tion has radically changed. There is now a large public demand
which it would be suicidal for the agencies to ignore and which
finds expression in important new legislation as well as in an
aroused public opinion. To such pressures the agencies respond-
ed in the past, and there are no a priori reasons why they should
not respond to such forces in the future. 1
Thus, the fact of increased public interest intervention before the Com-
missions indicates a renunciation of despair over the administrative
process and an important shift in the national power structure which
may possibly be reflected by increased responsiveness of the commissions
to public interest issues.
A second major consideration involved in public interest inter-
vention is a determination of what constitutes the "public interest."
While the courts have attempted to avoid any definition or interpretation,
the problem has received increased attention among political scientists.
One school of thought contends that the "public interest" is an absolute,
perceivable quality. According to Professor Landis "public interest" is
not a difficult phrase to interpret since this task merely requires reading
the phrase in light of the general background, tenor and sweep of the
statute." However, Professor Herring, after his study of the adminis-
trative system, discovered a major problem with such a public interest
standard:
Although it is clear that the official must balance the interests
of the conflicting groups before him, by what standards is
he to weigh their demands? To hold out the public interest as
a criterion is to offer an imponderable. Its value is psycho-
logical and does not extend beyond the significance that each
civil servant must find in the phrase for himself. Acting in
accordance with this subjective conception and bounded by
51. Jaffe, The Federal Regulatory Agencies in Perspective: Administrative Limi-
tations in a Political Setting, 11 B.C. IND. & Com. L Rv. 565, 569 (1970). See also
Jaffe, The Administrative Agency and Environmental Control, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 231
(1971).
52. J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 66-67 (1938). Current commentators
perceive the public interest as a "standard of goodness by which political acts can be
judged" [Cassinelli, The Public Interest in Political Ethics, in THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
NOMOS V 45 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962)] and as "the interests of freedom, equality, and
opportunity-the widely held and unorganized interests." Sorauf, Public Interest Re-
considered, 19 J. POL. 616, 639 (1957).
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his statutory competence, the bureaucrat selects from the special
interest before him a combination to which he gives official
sanction. Thus inescapably in practice the concept of public
interest is given substance by its identification with the interests
of certain groups."
Society is simply a complex of overlapping and intermingling groups.
As such, no single or absolute public interest exists. The process of
government, and thus administrative bodies, is not to rule in light of
the absolute standard of the public interest, but rather to achieve a
compromise-a harmony among the conflicting demands these groups
present."'
Consequently, if there is no abstract public interest, but rather only
a compromise of conflicting group pressures, Professor Reich appears
to be correct when he states that "the public interest is served by agency
policies which harmonize as many as possible of the competing interests
present in a given situation."5 Thus, if the public interest is a balancing
of all competing interests, does this mean that the administrative agencies
must admit any intervenor who claims a public interest right to inter-
vene? To reply that only "interested persons" should be permitted to
intervene is to return to the very language of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.56 How can one interest be denied participation when the
public interest is a blend of all interests? Yet, how can the system operate
with massive intervention by any and all groups that can convincingly
present an issue?
53. E. HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 23-24 (1936)
(emphasis in original). This same conclusion was reached thirty years earlier by
Bentley:
[W]e shall never find a group interest of the society as a whole .... The
society itself is nothing other than the complex of the groups that compose it.
A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 222 (1935).
54. [T~he myth of democracy demands that power be hidden behind symbols
designed to transform might into right-a requirement excellently fulfilled by
the use of a common good concept to disguise the fact that from the standpoint
of particular policies there is no such thing as a common good. Moreover,
this myth element performs a most constructive function in democratic govern-
ment. Interest groups are thereby compelled to justify their appeals in terms
of all the people, to include the entire public in phraseology designed only to
help them achieve their own political successes. However niggardly they plan
to be once the battle is over, they must offer to share the fruits of victory, there-
by placing in their opponents' hands a powerful weapon if promises are not kept.
H. SMITH, DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 29 (1960) (emphasis in original).
55. Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1234 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as Reich].
56. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1970).
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF BROADENED INTERVENTION
With the development of a "public interest" right to intervene,
participation in the administrative process began to increase. Critics
contend that the courts have overburdened the agencies, forcing them to
accept unlimited intervention and excessive delay. The consequences are
forecast in dire terms by many critics.57 Delay in the administrative
process is as pervasive as it is in the judicial system. Hundreds of cases
have pended for three years before the regulatory agencies, while delays
of one or two years are routine. The backlog of cases is tremendous.
Indeed, staffs are not even adequate to handle the new cases filed every
year. 5
8
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC"9 is often cited
by critics of broadened intervention. Consolidated Edison of New York
filed an application with the FPC to build a pumped storage hydroelectric
project on the Hudson River at Storm King Mountain. The Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference was allowed to intervene to object to
the project and offer alternatives. The FPC approved Con Ed's applica-
tion, and Scenic Hudson sought review. Initially, the court of appeals
held that the "public interest" doctrine entitled petitioners to obtain
judicial review.6" The case was then remanded to the FPC for considera-
57. It is reasonable to anticipate that this unprecedented participation by in-
dividual citizens and groups on their behalf will tax the time, energy and in-
genuity of the administrative agencies and result in major delays in the con-
summation of proceedings of great economic and social consequence.
Hanes, Citizens Participation and Its Impact Upon Prompt and Responsible Administra-
tive Action, 24 Sw. L.J. 731, 738 (1970). Unchecked public participation may present
additional problems.
A multi-party hearing which is allowed to proceed without restraint on the
presentation of evidence, or without restriction on participation by counsel or
individuals acting pro se can easily reach a dimension which makes the hearing
process irrelevant to administration of the very statutes for which the proceed-
ing exists.
Miller, Ecology and the Administrative Process, 23 AD. L. REV. 59, 63-64 (1970).
58. Ten years ago the FPC announced that it would take thirteen years with the
staff it had at that time to clear up 2,313 producer rate cases pending as of July 1, 1960,
and that with the contemplated 6,500 cases that would be filed during that thirteen-year
period it could not become current until the year 2043, even if its staff were tripled. Since
that time the FPC has succeeded in reducing its backlog by setting a natural gas rate for
an entire area rather than through company-by-company determination. See R. LoRcn,
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 49, 52-53 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
LORcH].
59. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
60. In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately
protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational as-
pects of power development, those who by their activities and conduct have ex-
hibited a special interest in such areas, must be held to be included in the class of
"aggrieved parties."
Id. at 616.
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tion of the alternatives proposed by Scenic Hudson, the court stating
that the FPC had failed in its statutory duty under the Federal Power
Act" to investigate any reasonable alternatives.62 In 1970, more than
seven years after the initial application, the FPC again approved the
Storm King project.6" Scenic Hudson again sought judicial review, but
this time the court of appeals affirmed the FPC decision.64 The court
cited the volume of the administrative record on remand. It involved 100
hearing days, the testimony of sixty expert witnesses and 675 exhibits.
The record was more than 19,000 pages in length. 5
This, case has engendered strong criticism. One commentator con-
tends that the court's original decision "presents an open invitation to
obstructionists to require repeated reopenings and delays of proceedings
where delay may be the equivalent of defeat."66 While there may be a
great deal of validity in these charges, they suffer from a complete lack
of supporting evidence and documentation. In order to reach any con-
clusion concerning a "public interest" right to intervene, more informa-
tion about the frequency of intervention by public interest groups and the
use of intervention by obstructionists is needed. Without this information,
61. All licenses issued .. .shall be on the following conditions: (a) That the
project adopted ... shall be such as in the judgment of the Commission will be
best adopted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway
or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the
improvement and utilization of water-power development, and for other bene-
ficial public uses, including recreational purposes; and if neccesary in order to
secure such plan the Commission shall have authority to require the modifica-
tion of any project and of the plans and specifications of the project works
before approval.
16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1970).
62. In this case, as in many others, the Commission has claimed to be the rep-
resentative of the public interest. This role does not permit it to act as an
umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it;
the right of the public must receive active and affirmative protection at the
hands of the Commission.
354 F.2d at 620. See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425
F.2d 543, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
63. 44 F.P.C. 350 (1970).
64. 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971).
65. Id. at 469. The FPC found the costs of alternatives to the Storm King project
amounted to an additional 137,000,000 dollars for gas turbines or 158,000,000 dollars for
a nuclear-gas turbine combination. The FPC determined that these additional costs
were not in the public interest. Id. at 471-72.
66. Seder, Regulatory Activism-The Aftermath of Scenic Hudson, 1969 ABA
PUB. UTIL. L. SECTION 3.
Sometimes interveners pile into a case for the sole purpose of delaying a
decision and making the proceeding too expensive for some competitors. In-
terveners impede the hearing and confuse the issues by long, complicated and
often needless cross-examination and other presentations of evidence.
Lorch, supra note 57, at 51-52.
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the most that can be said is that the courts have apparently failed to con-
sider the consequences of "public interest" intervention.1
7
LIMITATIONS ON THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" RIGHT TO INTERVENE
Suggestions have been offered to limit public interest participation
and its delay. Primarily, the proposals concern some form of advisory
hearing" or prehearing conference, 9 similar to the procedure followed
in judicial proceedings. It is contended that in this manner the number
of issues and questions in dispute can be reduced, frivolous claims dis-
missed and vast amounts of repetitive evidence and exhibits stipulated.
The Administrative Conference of the United States, in response to
Scenic Hudson, has studied the problems of delay and its causes in the
administrative system. The Conference's recommendation to Congress
in 19690 proposed both prehearing conferences and the filing of evidence
in written form. The system envisaged by the Conference entails the
submission of all evidence with the pleadings. At the prehearing conference
this bulk of evidence would be compiled and digested with stipulations
for the uncontested data and limitations on the disputed issues. As a
result, the hearing would be limited to short statements of sponsorship
of the exhibits and cross-examination would be limited to witness
credibility and expertise.71 While no congressional action has been taken
on these proposals, the FPC's Rules of Practice and Procedure had
earlier incorporated similar provisions." These regulations may alleviate
some of the problems of delay, but they do not fully solve the problem
of restricting public interest participation.
The courts, the force most responsible for increased participation,
have begun to address themselves to this problem. In United Church
67. Agencies confronted with increasingly crowded dockets and extensive de-
lays have had difficulty persuading the courts either that there was in fact little
a particular applicant for intervention could add to what the parties already in
the case would present or that the opportunities for participation were adequate
to protect the interest of the applicant even though they did not amount to full
status as a party. Not enough attention has been paid, in other words, to the
applicant's potential contribution or to the agency's need for expedition in the
handling of cases.
Shapiro, supra note 24, at 765-66.
68. Reich, supra note 54, at 1265.
69. Long, Administrative Proceedings: Their Time and Cost Can Be Cut Down, 49
A.B.A.J. 833 (1963).
70. 115 CONG. REc. 36178 (1969).
71. M. RUHLEN, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AUTHORIZA-
TION AND LICENSES ON DELAYS IN FORMAL LICENSING PROCEEDINGS 3-10 (draft report of
the Administrative Conference, 1969).
72. 18 C.F.R. §§ 1.18, 1.26 (1971). These rules were adopted by the FPC early
in comparison with other federal agencies. Order 141, 12 Fed. Reg. 8477 (1947).
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of Christ, The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
responded to the FCC's argument that it would be inundated with inter-
venors by reaffirming the Commission's discretion to establish and apply
regulations for restricting intervention:
including rules for determining which community representa-
tives are to be allowed to participate and how many are reason-
ably required to give the Commission the assistance it needs in
vindicating the public interest. The usefulness of any particular
petitioner for intervention must be judged in relation to other
petitioners and the nature of the claims it asserts as a basis
for standing. Moreover, it is no novelty . . . to require con-
solidation of petitions and briefs to avoid multiplicity of parties
and duplication of effort."
The courts have also approved other types of restrictions. In Tele-
phone Users Association, Inc. v. FCC,4 petitioner sought to intervene
in an FCC investigation of telephone service rates. The FCC denied
intervention, relying on its rule that requires all petitions for intervention
to be submitted within thirty days after notice of hearing." The court
affirmed the denlial as a reasonable restriction by the FCC.
The FPC's Rules of Practice and Procedure contain several restric-
tive proyisions. Rather than a flat thirty-day limit for intervention, the
FPC precludes intervention after the date fixed in the notice of any
proceeding."6 Only by a showing of extradordinary circumstances will the
Commission authorize a late filing.77 Participation by intervenors can
be limited," and a petition for intervention must set out clearly and
concisely petitioner's alleged right or interest and specifically explain
each contested fact or law with supporting authority."
73. 359 F.2d at 1006.
74. 375 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
75. 47 C.F.R. § 1.223(b) (1971).
76. 18 C.F.R. § 1.8(d) (1971).
77. Appalachian Power Co., 43 F.P.C. 494 (1970): Northern Natural Gas Co.,
42 F.P.C. 1274 (1969).
78. 18 C.F.R. § 1.8(f) (2) (1971). As a result it has become standard procedure
for the FPC to grant a petition to intervene subject to the following proviso:
Provided, however, that the participation of such intervener shall be limited to
matters affecting asserted rights and interests as specifically set forth in the
petition for leave to intervene; and Provided, further, that the admission of
such intervener shall not be construed recognition by the Commission that it
might be aggrieved because of any order or orders of the Commission entered
in this proceding.
Appalachian Power Co., 43 F.P.C. 495 (1970).
79. 18 C.F.R. § 1.8(c) (1971).
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In Citizens for Allegan County, Inc. v. FPC," petitioner filed the
necessary documents to intervene in a proposed electric company merger.
The FPC granted intervention but simultaneously approved the merger.
Petitioner sought judicial review, claiming intervention included a
meaningful opportunity for participation. While the court affirmed the
petitioner's right to intervene, it concluded that the evidence submitted
in the petition developed the facts of the dispute to a sufficient degree
to render further presentation unnecessary. The court suggested that
a memorandum setting forth the intervenor's position on the issues was
sufficient under the circumstances."'
The FPC's rules permit it to limit presentations or cross-
examinations where two or more intervenors have substantially like
interests or positions.8 2 In Palisades Citizens, the CAB, which has a
provision similar to the FPC's,ss denied a citizens' group intervention
to protest authorization of a helicopter service. Since the Department
of Transportation had already been granted formal intervention to
present similar claims, the court held that the denial was not an abuse of
the Board's discretion.8" Finally, the courts have also recognized an
agency's right to screen out frivolous claims or claims in which the peti-
tioner does not have a valid, identifiable interest.8 5
Thus, numerous techniques exist to restrict intervention validly
without eliminating adequate consideration of the claims of all groups
seeking to present significant interests.8 If additional restrictions should
become necessary, the administrative process is sufficiently flexible for
further adjustments to be made.
80. 414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
81. Id. at 1134.
[T]he right of opportunity for hearing does not require a procedure that will
be empty sound and show, signifying nothing. The precedents establish, for
example, that no evidentiary hearing is required where there is no dispute on
the facts and the agency proceeding involves only a question of law.
Id. at 1128.
82. 18 C.F.R. § 1.8(g) (1971).
83. 14 C.F.R. § 302.15(b) (1971).
84. See also Cities of Statesville v. AEC, 441 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Pied-
mont Cities Power Supply, Inc., representing eleven North Carolina cities, petitioned to
intervene in a AEC licensing of nuclear reactors. The AEC denied intervention to
Piedmont but admitted several of the cities. The court affirmed the AEC because the
interests of the cities were already adequately represented.
85. Martin-Trigona v. FCC, 432 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hale v. FCC, 425
F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
86. One indirect and particularly undesirable technique for limiting public interest
group participation involves the type of proceeding initiated:
[Ain agency's insistence on making decisions case-by-case on the basis of a
lengthy evidentiary record may favor the regulated industry at the expense of
upholders of the "public" interest because it throws the decision into the forum
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THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE PROPOSALS
Presently, few restrictions on public interest intervention are neces-
sary since such activity has not reached significant levels." Cost is the
major reason underlying this sparseness of activity, as the courts have
long recognized. s8 Public interest groups are often ad hoc, loosely
organized associations which exist only for the purpose of meeting a
common threat. Financing is often voluntary and meager, hardly suf-
ficient to meet the immediate organizational costs. 9
in which the industry groups are best equipped to compete. It is not merely
that trial-type hearings can be used to delay agency action-which is true-but
they can also be used to obscure general principles in a mass of factual data,
the compilation and presentation of which the industry is better prepared to
accomplish than either public interest groups or agency staff. Therefore, one
way of encouraging public participation in the agency process (viewing the
process as a whole) is to focus that process more in the direction of deciding
general principles by rulemaking.
Cramton, supra note 48, at 17-18. See also Shaprio, The Choice of Rulemaking or Ad-
judication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
But see Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking
and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1970)
The very facet of rulemaking procedures which is applauded for permitting
broad participation may serve as well to keep the depth of involvement and the
treatment of specific, complex issues shallow. Participation in rulemaking
procedures is not, of course, inevitably superficial; nor is it certain that adjudi-
catory procedures will produce analytical depth. It is not unreasonable though
to expect that adjudication would provide opportunity for more meaningful
involvement.
Id. at 516.
87. In responding to a 1966 congressional questionnaire about the causes of admin-
istrative delay, not a single member of the FPC or any of its hearing examiners referred
to intervention as a cause or factor of delay. SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., QUESTION-
NAIRE ON DELAY IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (Comm. Print 1966). The only com-
prehensive study of public participation in the administrative process was conducted by
the Administrative Conference of the United States in late 1971. Based on preliminary
staff reports, Chairman Roger C. Cramton reported that public participation is still ex-
tremely rare. In fact, the staff found no cases where public participation created any
procedural problems. Cramton, supra note 48, at 5, 18. The final report of the study
was compiled and written by Professor Gellhorn, who concluded that, "The number of
public interventions in any one agency is, in most cases, still limited and the proceedings
are unique." E. GELLHORN, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 4
(1971) [hereinafter cited as GELLHORN]. "The number of administrative trials in which
public participants intervene as parties is still relatively few." Id. at 5.
88. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608, 617 (2d Cir. 1965).
89. Attorney fees alone can range from 30,000 to 40,000 dollars for an FDA pro-
ceeding and to over 100,000 dollars for a major FTC case. Cramton, supra note 48, at
23. If all evidence is submitted in written form and the hearing is drastically limited,
attorney fees can be sharply reduced. Another major cost is transcripts. The agencies
receive transcripts under contract from private reporting companies which also provide
copies to the parties at higher costs. These public copies cost as much as three dollars
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The Administrative Conference has presented several solutions
for aiding public interest groups in meeting these costs.9 In regard to
transcript costs, it is contended that the parties should not be subsidiz-
ing the agency's copy as the system now operates. 1 Instead, the agency
should bear the full price of recording service as a proper cost of govern-
mental regulation and each party should be charged only its own duplica-
tion costs. Further, some system may be arranged for an indigent party
to have access to a transcript free of charge. The proposal seems wise in
light of the overall purpose of public interest intervention. The cost would
not be prohibitive on the agency, while the increased amount of inter-
vention would not seriously hamper an agency's effectiveness.
Additionally, the Conference has suggested that the administrative
agencies adopt rules to assist public interest intervenors in meeting
attorney fees. The proposals are: (1) encouraging pro bono repre-
sentation; (2) allowing attorney fee awards; (3) appointing agency
personnel to represent interests; (4) funding the legal expenses of inter-
venors and (5) establishing an independent representational agency.2
The encouraging of pro bono representation does not appear to be
a significant change from the present. Much of the public interest legal
work today is being done on a pro bono basis, and there does not seem
to be much that an agency can do to encourage more. The pro bono
attorney has an abundance of prospective clients, and this enables him
to screen out frivolous or obstructive claims.
The other proposals, however, involve serious problems. The award-
ing of attorney fees could disrupt the entire administrative system.
Administration of the program would be rendered extremely difficult,
if not impossible, by the problems of determining who made a con-
tribution and the amount to be paid. In addition the cost of such a
program might be prohibitive. Such a program might also result in
encouraging a class of attorneys who are more fee-conscious than mindful
of their clients' interests. Finally, the proposal could easily result in the
flood of intervenors which the critics have been predicting, While more
public interest representation is desirable, the award of attorney fees
could easily result in a mass of irresponsible intervenors. Since con-
gressional approval seems doubtful for a system of money awards, it
per page in some agencies, and major cases involve thousands of pages. See GELLHORN,
supra note 87, at 31 n.105.
90. COMM. ON AGENCY ORGANIZATION & PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION B: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE HEAR-
INGS (1971) [hereinafter cited as RECOMMENDATION~ B].
91. GELLHORN, supra note 87, at 32.
92. RECOMMENDATION B, supra note 90, at 5.
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is unlikely the proposal will ever be implemented.
The third and fourth proposals for agency representation and legal
services funding encounter the same difficulties. The quality of represen-
tation is uncertain since the attorneys would not be free from political
pressure. The public interest group may not be willing to accept a staff
attorney if it feels that the staff has already failed to protect the public.
The costs of either program would be extremely high, and, once again,
the demands of public interest intervenors could overtax the adminis-
trative agencies. Despite these drawbacks, serious consideration is being
given these ideas. The FCC is currently studying a proposal to create
an Office of Public Counsel to represent listener groups, while the FTC
is investigating its authority to finance public intervenors." The FPC,
however, has already declined to finance intervenors."4
The final proposal for an independent advocate agency is subject
to many of the same criticisms. While an independent agency could
develop a high degree of expertise and avoid the conflict of interest of
agency counsel, it would be subject to greater political pressure and less
likely to represent extreme or unorthodox views.95 As the agency becomes
more institutionalized, it will become its own client with its own interests
to safeguard. As a result, most public interest groups would not be
satisfied with this official representation. In many cases, further public
interest intervention may even be precluded, as it was in Palisades
Citizens, on the basis that formal intervention in the public interest by
a governmental agency pre-empts the field. The policy of an administra-
tive agency may become to deny intervention to all public interest groups
while admitting the government advocate with its own peculiar self-
interest. Despite these problems, the creation of a Consumer Protection
Agency is imminent.98 Although this new agency may become a valuable
tool in representing the interests of unorganized consumers, it may deny
the opportunity of participation to other organizations of a voluntary
nature.
93. Cramton, supra note 49, at 32.
94. The FPC denied a request by People Organized to Win Effective Regulation
(POWER) for 10,000 dollars in costs and fees. 35 Fed. Reg. 14001 (1970).
95. Johnson, supra note 30, at 893.
96. In the 91st Congress, the Senate passed by a 74-4 vote the Senate bill (S. 4459)
to create such an agency with the right to intervene in any other agency proceedings.
Further action was stalled, however, by the House Rules Committee. Similar legisla-
tion (H.R. 16) was introduced in the 92d Congress and passed by the House on Oct. 15,
1971, by a vote of 344-44. Senate confirmation is expected. Section 204 of the bill
authorizes the Consumer Protection Agency to intervene as a matter of right in "any
investigation, hearing, or other proceeding which does not solely involve an adjudica-
tion for the purpose of imposing a fine, penalty, or forfeiture" so long as the Agency
finds that the "proceeding may substantially affect the interests of consumers."
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SUMMARY
The regulation of industry by administrative bodies is primarily a
process of balancing competing claims and demands by divergent groups
and segments of society. In order to determine the "public interest" or
the best compromise of these interests, the administrative body should
be open and available to valid claims of responsible interests. The device
of intervention is uniquely well-suited for this purpose so long as exces-
sive delays or costs are not imposed on the administrative body. Judicial
recognition of a "public interest" right to intervene is an important
guarantee that each agency will be presented with the full range of
interests, policies and considerations. While the costs of intervention
have prevented effective participation by most public interest groups,
these costs can be reduced by lower transcript charges and extremely
limited attorney presentations. Other schemes of fee awards or agency
representation are not in the best interests of the public interest groups
and may result in a breakdown of the administrative process.
WRAY C. HISER
